Yes the QMK active branch and some news that my accounts are now filed. Zero in/zero out as a boring COVID an low contact availability year. So Ltd. status continues as far as I’m aware. I’ll keep you all informed.
So now the send_unicode_string() function is used for a macro system within the keymap latest coding. This is opposed to how the macro layer emits function key combinations, which is more in line for a tool on the computer handling it. I’ve also added repeated substring compression too. (“\\0” to “\\9”)
So more of a hard baked solution, but does allow more complex multi-character glyphs to be produced instead of just one Unicode code point. So with about 1100 bytes free about, that’s about thirty UTF-8 bytes per key action (over the 37 defined key action macros). Even “\\\\” is defined for emitting an initial backslash, just so backslash can be used as a prefix for more complex macro processing than just print until end of string.
Other macro features like tapping key codes for nested macros? Yes, if the keycode is added to the array so “\\A” will tap the first keycode.
The POX Algorithm RFC. How to show an auth token when you have privacy but no booking or other door duty. The phone occluded xenomorph algorithm. A complex cypher to protect data at all points in transmission. What really gets shown is an event-specific checksum verify on some encrypted data with can be further queried by a provider (such as the NHS) to obtain validity and scope for event purpose on a statistical check basis to reduce server traffic load and focus on hot areas.
At 2953 bytes of data capacity in a QR barcode (23624 bits) there is enough scope for a double signature and some relevant data in escrow for falsification auditing. The following data layers are relevant with keys in between.
- Verify credential entry VCE (the blind of public record customs inquiries)
- validity decrypt key (event private key part) VDK QR
- Door event transit DET (the over the shoulder mutable) QR
- event encrypt key (event public key) EEK QR
- Phone independent ephemeral PIE (the for me check)
- A public blockchain signed hashed issue SHI (the public record) QR
- authority signature keys (the body responsible for a trace of falsifications)
- hashed phone number key (symmetric cypher)
- record blind key (when combined with the event private key part makes the effective private key. Kept secret from the event)
- confidentiality key (database to publication network security layer)
- Actual data record ADR (the medical facts)
Various keys are required but covering the QR codes needed is perhaps better.
- The manager VDK QR (given to the door manager)
- The issue SHI QR (given by the provider)
- The event EEK QR (posted online or outside the event)
- The entry DET QR (made for the bouncer to scan)
At the point of issue, there may be a required pseudo-event to check that all is working well. The audit provider or provider (such as the NHS) has enough data on a valid VCE to call the user and the event in a conference call. Does the credential holder answer to speak to an echoing bouncer? Does the provider send a text?
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Pipeline-Cache-Big-RISC-Computational-ebook/dp/B07XY9RSHH/ref=sr_1_1?keywords=pipeline+cache+big+risc&qid=1568807888&sr=8-1 is a nice paper on some computation issues, and eventually covers some politics and vitamin biochemistry. Not a fan? Still letting your biome let you shout at the bad people not feeding your hunger?
Shovel in the gammon all you want, and load it up with chips as a little survivor from ancient times takes advantage of the modern high carb diet and digs a hole for you.